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EMBEDDING SUCCESS IN THE MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP
The lessons learned and commentaries regarding the Defense Department's media embedded reporter policy and resulting coverage of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are still being written. It is clear that the wider use of embedded reporters provided the world an unprecedented view of combat and of the warfighters. This state-of-the-art view brought the public real-time images, sounds and soldiering via gyroscopic satellite vehicles, videophones, cell phones, and night vision photography.
However, what exactly has this 21 st century coverage provided the American public and the world? Has it provided a comprehensive, balanced, and true perspective of the prosecution of war and its effects, a higher level of journalism, or just merely "info-tainment" 1 ? Or could it be the media utilizing its new technology in an attempt to fill the 24-hour news cycle and feed the public's hunger for knowledge about the war? These questions will continue to be debated by the fourth estate, academia, the military and the public.
Information is power. As one of the four elements of power in a Grand Strategy, its proper management is vital to our national interests as stated by David Jablonsky, instructor at the U.S.
Army War College, "This combination of enhanced communication and dissemination of information, however, is a two-edged sword that cuts across all the social determinants of power in national strategy." 2 With the impending battle with Iraq as part of the Global War on Terrorism, the Department of Defense was concerned with implementing a policy to counter disinformation and to disseminate international messages, which would provide the media greater access to the battlefield in delivering accurate combat reports. In return DoD would be able to get out its message about a smaller, swifter, highly technical, fighting force engaged in liberating a people from the hands of a brutal and desperate dictator.
THE MILITARY-MEDIA RELATIONSHIP SINCE VIETNAM
The historic relationship between the military and the media has been a mix of cooperation and tension. Members of the fourth estate seek to obtain and report the truth while the military, seek to control the flow of the truth. This tension combined with goals and unique personality traits of those called to each profession has been cause for a multitude of disagreements and high level of distrust.
In no other conflict was the relationship between the two more strained and distrustful than in the Vietnam conflict. This adversarial relationship during the conflict was "intensified and then institutionalized … when the Pentagon and the press both seemed to lose respect for the mission, veracity and honor of the other side."
According to William V. Kennedy in The Media and the Military, the roots of this conflict arose from cultural and ideological differences between those who enter the military and those who serve in the media. 4 He asserts that these differences combined with reporters' lack of knowledge of the military prior to assignment in the field resulted in uninformed or negative
reporting. This reporting caused the leadership to, "view these stories as a major reason they were losing the war at home while they were winning the battles in Vietnam." 5 Following the Tet Offensive a "credibility gap" emerged, as "the disturbing images on the TV screen were in sharp contrast to the official reports that the United States was … winning the war and would be out of Vietnam soon." 6 Negative reporting and decreasing public support led to a "lasting distrust for the press … on the part of many, if not most, U.S. officers of all services…" which, "shorn of the pretenses necessary to maintain a workable day-to-day relationship, …" was "hatred."
7 From the conclusion of the conflict in Vietnam and throughout the next two-plus decades, journalists and military members were ingrained with enmity towards each other. Due to this bitter relationship, the military limited press access in later conflicts. 8 Two such conflicts with no or limited press access were Grenada and Panama.
In 1983, during the invasion of Grenada, there were no reporters accompanying U.S.
troops. "Reporters who traveled to the island in boats were turned away at gunpoint." 9 In 1989, at the onset of the invasion of Panama, despite the Pentagon's promises to assist the press in reaching the island, hundreds of reporters were stranded in Miami, FL, and Costa Rica. 10 As a result, "there were no pictures or eyewitness accounts of three battles the first day, in which 23 U.S. soldiers were killed and 265 wounded."
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For the Gulf War, the military eased the severe restrictions to access and employed a pool system. Critics noted that, "the Pentagon micromanaged coverage, setting up a pool system where specially chosen 'pool' reporters were taken to the front to gather material to share with other journalists. But the pool was never allowed to witness a battle as it unfolded." 12 John
MacArthur, Harper's magazine publisher and author, wrote, "the government and media misled the public and that pool reporting was a 'crushing defeat' for freedom of the press."
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In Kosovo and during the early action in Afghanistan, both largely air campaigns with the exception of Special Forces ground units, "there was no concerted effort to put reporters near the fighting and the press complained bitterly that the Pentagon was slow to confirm events on the ground." 14 According to the media, the pool system was not working.
Following a raid on Mullah Omar's headquarters by Army Rangers with no pool reporter, news organizations executives were up in arms to the Pentagon. Shortly afterward, the Navy and the Marine Corps began to embed reporters on ships and with Marine units on a trial basis.
Because of the much positive coverage of operations by the Marines, the Army decided to embed as well.
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BATTLE FOR PUBLIC OPINION PRE-OIF
Following the tragedies of September 11, 2001 , U.S. and international public opinion firmly supported military engagement in retaliation against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as part of the war against terrorism.
When public debate shifted to the question of Iraq's role in terror, U.S. policy support waned at home and internationally, including that of some long-standing allies. The battle lines were drawn between those who supported toppling Hussein preemptively to eliminate the growing threat of Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction, and those who opposed invading a sovereign nation with a duly-elected president who had neither attacked nor threatened a neighboring country.
The battle for public opinion was debated in all available media: print, television, radio and the Internet. Much of U.S. opinion favored action against Iraq while much of the international community opposed it. Adding to the anti-invasion fervor was incendiary, anti-U.S.
reporting by Al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based satellite network that broadcasts throughout the Arabic-language region.
With United Nations resolutions, U.S. ultimatums, and deadlines drawing near, the The embedding plan would assign more than 600 reporters at a ratio of 80 percent U.S.
reporters to 20 percent non-U.S. reporters, to include Arabic outlets such as Al-Jazeera. Ten percent of the U.S. reporters were to be selected from "local media that were from the towns where (the) troops were coming from." 19 The military distributed assignments but allowed the news organizations to select their own reporters.
War coverage would not be limited to embedded reporters. News organizations could send non-embedded reporters, or "unilaterals," but Clarke emphasized that due to the inherent dangers in combat that the safety of non-embedded reporters could not be guaranteed. In fact, unilaterals were discouraged from approaching the battlefield as they or their vehicles could be misidentified as combatants.
EMBED GROUND RULES
DoD released a nine-page document detailing the ground rules for which the embed journalists had to agree in order to be assigned to a unit. The document detailed a variety of responsibilities for the media as well as the military, and do's and don'ts that defined the conditions for access and coverage. The following is excerpted from the ground rules: 
TABLE 1
It was clear by the ground rules that the military intended to allow as much access, interaction and coverage as possible while maintaining tight operational security.
MEDIA BOOT CAMPS
In an effort to familiarize reporters with the military and the possible conditions in which they would work, the military offered news organizations orientation training. Many reporters spent one week at one of the Pentagon's "Embed Boot Camps," where they "were given a crash course in all things military …" 20 to include nuclear, biological, and chemical training and first aid. The boot camps were held at Ft. Benning, GA; Ft Dix, NJ; and Quantico Marine Corp Base and Norfolk Naval Station in Virginia. The training was not required but encouraged. Reporters hoping to be selected for "choice" embed assignments hoped to improve their chances by participating in the boot camps. The training was designed to be educational and challenging.
Andrew Jacobs, a New York Times prospective embed, termed the week as, "alternately enlightening, entertaining, horrifying, and physically exhausting." 21 Training camps tested the mettle of embed hopefuls. The training "weeded out those who mistakenly thought that covering a war would be a heck of an adventure. After barely surviving pretend war, some opted to not experience the real thing." 22 In addition to the boot camps, many reporters were given the opportunity to spend time with military units training in the U.S. prior to going off to war. This allowed the reporters and military to build trust in each other and to get familiar with each other's terminology and routines.
It also allowed the news organizations and reporters the opportunity to test their new equipment, techniques, and procedures for reporting in what would be a fluid, hectic environment.
Walter Rogers of CNN noted, "that the U.S. Army was nothing short of brilliant in terms of the way they prepared us for it… you get to know the people you're covering… and you build a rapport. And that rapport stands you through the whole time very well."
NEWS ORGANIZATIONS PREPARE FOR WAR
With the embed policy in place, journalists volunteering to go, and new-generation communication technology available to them, news organizations spent millions of dollars in ramping up to cover a war like never before. As with any costly, large-scale operation, proper planning and preparation by the news organizations was essential. There were a multitude of logistics questions and internal policy issues for which to plan and factor, which were not present in the previous war with Iraq.
Important questions included --
• What type of communications equipment and how much to bring?
• How do you get the equipment inside Iraq?
• What type of vehicles could be obtained and used?
• What type of safety equipment was needed?
• What would be the safest way to travel?
• Do we send unilaterals? If so, how many?
Factors to plan for included --
• Passports, visas
• Food
• Coordination between anchor desks, CENTCOM and the Pentagon
• Utilization of on-air retired military for analysis
• Injury or death of a reporter
• Loss of equipment
Planning for large-scale, fast moving operations far from home is not common to news organizations as it is in the military, so they had to learn fast and on-the-job.
CONCERNS OVER THE EMBED POLICY
Despite the tremendous momentum for both the military and the media in gaining access to cover battlefield operations live, the policy had many detractors from the outset. With the plan for the embedded journalists to live, eat, sleep and do everything their military counterparts would do, except to carry arms, some questioned whether they would grow too "close to the military personnel with whom they are traveling" and "could sacrifice objectivity and a broad range of reporting in return for access." 24 These voices argued that embeds would be "in bed"
with their military units. Dan Rather of CBS News quipped about the arrangement that, "there's a pretty fine line between being embedded and being entombed."
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Many countered this concern by noting the close working relationships of those who cover political campaigns or police beats and manage to maintain objectivity.
Other concerns related to possible censorship by the military. Critics speculated that the press might not be allowed to operate freely or film and report on what they desired, especially if the coverage was disturbing or unflattering to the military.
Of concern to all was the safety and security of the embedded journalists. Being "up close and personal" with front line troops in the line of fire, and possible chemical attack, called for equipping crews with body armor, helmets and gas masks. Corresponding training on the proper wear and use of the equipment became a necessity. Despite the precautions, the nightmare scenario of journalist vulnerability on the battlefield was realized.
COVERAGE DURING DECISIVE OPERATIONS (WAR)
The challenge facing news organizations was to provide an accurate depiction of war from a variety of angles and from numerous resources. In addition to the "embeds" and unilaterals, reporters were stationed on ships, at CENTCOM headquarters in Doha, Qatar, in Kuwait staging areas, and at the Pentagon. As reporters in the field covered only their "slice" of the war, the big picture of operations would have to be assembled at media headquarters by producers, anchors, and editors.
To aid in providing newsrooms, on-air anchors and the public a better understanding of military operations, scores of retired military experts were hired. In the lead-up to the war, they assisted news organizations in developing briefing materials regarding the variety of military hardware and systems as well as offering insights as to how the war might be fought. During the combat operations they were available for 24/7 analysis.
At the onset of combat operations, the television media utilized their state-of-the-art technology in providing captivating, real-time images of the battlefield: tanks speeding through the desert, firefights and close air support. This riveting coverage fueled the public's thirst for information in a manner never before achievable. It was as if the public was drawn and glued to their televisions like motorists ubiquitously peering at an accident scene.
U.S. broadcast networks and cable news outlets were on the air live twenty-four hours a day displaying virtually all that the embeds could provide -from exciting confrontations with the enemy to the mundane chores shoveling foxholes. It was during these alternating events that the Pentagon claimed its largest public relations success -the display of American soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors as everyday people in extraordinary circumstances who were dedicated to serving their country and protecting their buddies. These images of bravery and of camaraderie combined with the "shout outs" to family and friends back home were priceless in lifting the level of patriotism, appreciation, and support for the troops. Though embed coverage was exciting, not all were satisfied with the journalist standards.
Criticism was leveled at the embedded journalists due to their apparent lack of reports critical of coalition forces. Allegations were that the embed reports were skewed in favor of the military and displayed imbalanced coverage. Reporters stationed forward at CENTCOM commented to briefers that there was a dearth of reporting on Iraqi casualties, either combatant or civilian.
Iraqi state-run media or Arab media outlets had been running daily video of civilian casualties credited to errant bombs or attacks that CENTCOM could not readily confirm nor deny.
CENTCOM briefers offered details of these incidents following full, detailed investigations, but detractors saw this as stonewalling to cover up unflattering incidents. Jon Donvan, an ABC unilateral news correspondent, said, "we go in to talk to the civilians, then we hear the Pentagon tell us that a lot of civilians are soldiers pretending to be civilians.
We're prime hostage material." 28 During the early stages of the conflict, he and his team of six would enter Iraq only during the daytime hours and into sections under American control. He stated that he felt that he did not believe that his perspective of the war was better than that of the embedded journalists, "just a different one." 29 His charge from ABC news was to cover segments of the war with the Iraqi people to gain insight as to their aspirations for the future in light of the coalition action and promises. 30 Embedded reporters on the move with the fastadvancing troops could not be afforded this opportunity. With the loss of the majority of the embedded journalists, there was a distinct change in the tone and focus of coverage from Iraq. In contrast to the soldier-centric coverage in the major combat phase prior to entering Baghdad, the next phase of reporting targeted many aspects of Iraqi life, the capture of Ba'athist leaders, and insurgent attacks against coalition forces. There was little war coverage despite the fact that there was still fighting ongoing in the Northern region of the country.
POST-REGIME CHANGE COVERAGE
As the weeks passed and the military transitioned to stability operations, the two primary two categories of stories to cover were the efforts to restore services and rebuild the country and the challenges that the coalition faced -protests over the lack of services and security;
increased crime, casualties due to roadside bombs, and sabotage to oil pipelines. 
POLICIES FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS
The future of war is not entirely clear. In a globalization scenario, the possibility of large armies going head-to-head is greatly reduced, if not, unlikely. Therefore, asymmetrical conflicts such as the Global War on Terrorism are more likely. Retired Army Major General Robert Scales, former Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, envisions that "future conflicts will be fought by smaller, less-conventional, more technical teams…(which are) more SOF-like." 35 The modern military has been utilized increasingly in operations other than major combat.
These operations are termed, Military Operations Other than War or (MOOTW). The U.S.
scalable military of the 21 st century will be employed in appropriately sized "packages" depending on the operational scenario. • Peace Operations
MOOTW Promote Peace and Support US Civil Authorities
• Freedom of Navigation
An example of utilizing a scalable media plan is illustrated in comparing the two categories of war and MOOTW. In the decisive operations phase of a large-scale war, there would be a large number of troops of all branches of service from coalition countries over a vast area.
Since the nature of major combat is hostile and fluid, the military should maintain a tight control over the battlefield in knowing the location of friendly forces, enemy forces and media.
Therefore, development of an embedded journalist media plan as in OIF would be appropriate for the efficiency of operations and for the safety of the journalists. Similarly, embedding a pool reporter or two with a unit during the stability operations phase, where forces are employed on a smaller-scale in equally dangerous combat situations to that of major conflict, is advisable.
Operations of this nature include combating insurgents, raids on high-value targets, and actions involving volatile situations or culturally sensitive locations. Embedding one or two pool journalists would allow for appropriate media coverage and reduce the risks to media personnel.
Assignment of the journalist(s) can be made via pre-arranged schedule based on days of the month or by a particular week.
In MOOTW, the nature of the mission, size of the forces, area of operation, level of hostilities, host nation support, and media access will vary greatly. The first section under MOOTW in Table 1 shows the variety of missions involved. Though military operations may be smaller in scale, the military may not be able to control the area of operations such as in war.
The media will be less likely to accept guidelines in these operations though DoD should still offer access to units involved. Operational commanders can expect the media to operate independently of the military in covering peacekeeping operations, NEO, and nation assistance.
Commanders should leverage the media during these operations as they could depict American troops in a positive light in support of U.S policy.
However, DoD should insist on a small pool of reporters to accompany forces in peacemaking operations, raids, strikes, counterinsurgencies, and counter-terrorist operations involving increased operational security requirements and greater risks to forces and journalists.
While a small group of journalists can accurately and credibly report on the scope of operations, a larger group of reporters covering these swiftly moving and potentially lethal operations can be a hindrance to the forces and negatively influence the mission.
In the remaining segment of MOOTW in Table 1 , the operations are less likely to involve hostilities and operational security. Again, DoD should offer and encourage media access to units throughout these operations. The limiting factor in these operations would be those involving Navy vessels, where space may be at a premium. Therefore, in freedom of navigation operations, counter-drug operations via the sea, and protection of shipping operations, pool reporters are recommended.
CONCLUSION
In the information age with access to billions of people via worldwide 24-hour news outlets, the Internet, and a variety of traditional media, the significance of information as an element of national power is highlighted, particularly during times of crisis and war. Following the tragedies of September 11, 2001 , the messages emanating from the U.S. government and that of our enemies and detractors have been diametrically opposed.
As a super power, the United States can stand mightily against those who have harmed it or have aims to do so. But in the court of public opinion, might does not always mean right. Therefore, it is essential that informational power be utilized in support of our national policies and actions.
The primary goals of the unprecedented access to the battlefield by the world's media via the embedded media policy were to demonstrate the professionalism of coalition troops and to counter disinformation by our adversaries. These goals were met.
Coalition troops, and especially the American soldier, sailor, airman, marine and Coast Guardsman, were portrayed by embedded journalists as fierce, efficient warriors as well as compassionate individuals. Reporting from embedded battlefield journalists countered disinformation generated by the Iraqi propaganda machine as well as coverage from other outlets opposed to the campaign or U.S. policies and allowed the world to decide the truth for itself.
The strategy to achieve these goals was an unprecedented level of cooperation. The cooperation was initiated with the planning and preparation leading up to conflict and forged between the troops and journalists throughout the conflict. The cooperation fostered improved relationships between the media and the military. The result was that each party benefited from the relationship and the coverage.
Can these same goals be met in future conflicts when there is less motivation toward cooperation, or when operations do not support embedding journalists? The conditions around future conflicts will certainly be different and the relationship between the military and the media may have taken a new direction. Future conflicts will be covered by the media in some manner with or without the full cooperation of the military. It is in the best interest of the military, in support of national policy, that a certain level of cooperation be maintained in order to leverage the media in shaping its messages and images to be reported.
With the Global War on Terror, the continued threat of asymmetric warfare, and the transformation of the U.S. military to lighter, more rapid and capable, scalable forces, operational plans need to be developed to provide for the utilization and optimization of the media. These plans need to take into account the lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and need to allow for scalable media presence.
During OIF, critics leveled allegations that objective journalism suffered because of the close relationships that developed between the embedded journalists and their assigned units.
The media will weigh that criticism and will not accept the same guidelines as in OIF. Issues that media organizations will push for in future conflicts include:
• increased independence of embedded journalists
• roving embedded journalists 
